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1. Introduction 
Fiscal issues have recently become more prominent in central bank discussions as a result of the 
widespread adoption of a stable, medium-term orientation for both monetary and fiscal policy. This 
development has prompted a re-examination of the respective roles of fiscal and monetary policies as 
stabilisation tools, and a reassessment of the role played by public sector imbalances in some recent 
emerging market crises. A large volume of analytical work has been devoted to these issues. 
However, relatively little is known about the way central banks in emerging economies assess fiscal 
positions in their countries, or about the practical problems that arise for monetary policy from issues 
such as public debt sustainability, the use of fiscal rules and intergovernmental fiscal relations. These 
issues are important both for central banks that set monetary policy on their own, taking fiscal policy 
as given, and for those that have adopted an institutional framework for coordinating monetary and 
fiscal policies. This paper attempts to fill this void. It is based largely on responses of central banks 
from emerging market economies to a BIS questionnaire, and subsequent discussions among central 
bank officials at a meeting held in Basel in December 2002.
2 The focus in the paper is on levels of 
fiscal balances and, hence, concerns for monetary policy that arise from fiscal sustainability issues. 
The accompanying paper in this volume by Mohanty and Scatigna discusses how central banks 
assess changes in fiscal positions and their effect on monetary policy. 
Section 2 describes different ways of assessing fiscal positions by central banks. Section 3 looks at 
public debt sustainability. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the use of fiscal policy rules and intergovernmental 
fiscal relations that might support a more stable medium-term orientation for fiscal policy, and how 
they affect the conduct of monetary policy. Section 6 concludes with a brief overview of approaches to 
fiscal consolidation and their implications for monetary policy. 
2.  How central banks assess fiscal positions 
Central government budget 
Following the public finance literature (see Box 1), central banks in emerging economies rely on a 
range of budget balances in their analyses of the fiscal position of the government and the public 
sector. The choice depends on the aspects of fiscal policy that are of greatest interest to central 
banks. The most common measure of the fiscal position remains the balance of the cash-based 
central government budget. This is the simplest measure of the fiscal balance and the one linked most 
clearly to monetary financing of the budget deficit. Moreover, information on central budget positions is 
usually available on a monthly basis and quite rapidly. Policymakers in central banks therefore rely 
extensively on updates concerning the central government budget, making various adjustments to 
arrive at the measures of fiscal position that are relevant for monetary policy. Another rationale for this 
                                                       
1  The authors thank Marc Klau and Michela Scatigna for valuable research assistance and Palle Andersen, Madhu Mohanty, 
Ramon Moreno, Philip Turner, Agustin Villar and Bill White for numerous useful comments. The views expressed are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS or central banks attending the meeting. 
2  The discussion refers to 23 emerging market economies from Asia (China, Hong Kong SAR (hereafter, Hong Kong), India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru); central and eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey); and the Middle 
East and Africa (Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Africa). 
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 measure is that the central government typically dominates local governments in terms of both size 
and involvement in financial markets. 
 
Box 1 
Measures of the fiscal deficit 
According to the public finance literature, there is no ideal measure of the budget balance, but rather a set of 
different budget balances that could be considered as more appropriate, each applicable to a specific 
circumstance; see Blejer and Cheasty (1993). Alternative definitions of the budget balance are unavoidable 
given the scope and operations of the public sector. Jacobs (2002), for instance, considers 22 alternative 
budget balances for South Africa. 
A conceptually most appropriate way of measuring deficits would be to look at the change in the public sector’s 
net worth (assets minus liabilities). In practice, such a measurement is quite difficult, if not impossible, in most 
countries. The difficulty lies in the valuation of public sector assets. As a result, fiscal deficits are usually 
measured by looking at the change in public sector liabilities. The conventional measure is the difference 
between consolidated government expenditure (including interest payments on public debt and subsidies given 
in the form of loans, but excluding amortisation payments) and total cash receipts (including taxes, non-tax 
revenue and grants, but excluding privatisation proceeds); see IMF (1986). By focusing on the financing gap 
that has to be closed by net borrowing, this conventional definition provides both a measure of the 
government’s contribution to aggregate demand (and through this, to the external current account imbalance), 
and a measure of the crowding-out of the private sector in the financial markets. 
 
 
With the development of domestic and international financial markets during the 1990s, governments have 
become less liquidity constrained in carrying out fiscal policy and more adept at separating the impact and 
accounting of a fiscal action. Cash-based accounting thus increasingly failed to capture adequately the timing 
of fiscal actions and their impact on the economy. In response, governments worldwide (starting with New 
Zealand in the late 1980s) have started to mve toward resource-based accounting, which facilitates a more 
comprehensive assessment of the economic impact of government activity and the sustainability of fiscal 
policy. In particular, the introduction of the accrual (instead of cash) basis for recording transactions and the 
integration of balance sheets with flows for government are consistent with the need for government behaviour 
to be determined in the context of its intertemporal budget constraint. Thus, government policies will not be 
sustainable if they reduce the net worth of government too much. In a parallel effort aimed at improving data 
comparability, the United Nations developed a measure of the budget balance of the general government 
based on the UN’s system of national accounts (SNA). To a large extent this framework has also been adopted 
in the 2001 revision of the IMF’s Manual on Government Finance Statistics. 
 
Public sector
General government  Public corporations
Central government 
Non-financial  Monetary public corporations






Other financial institutions (including social security, 
(non-depository) if not included in 
government budgets) 
Countries with a history of high inflation, such as Brazil and Turkey, have tended to concentrate on the 
primary balance (total revenue less non-interest expenditure), as the main measure of their fiscal 
position because this measure helps them to detect more clearly any deterioration in the fiscal position 
caused by an acceleration in inflation. When inflation is stable, the primary balance is generally not 
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 affected by the level of inflation because government revenues and non-debt related expenditures 
tend to follow the evolution of the price level. However, when inflation accelerates, real revenue tends 
to fall faster than real expenditure due to delays in collection of taxes (the so-called Olivera-Tanzi 
effect). While this deterioration shows up in both primary and overall balances, the primary balance 
gives a clearer picture of the effort needed to achieve fiscal consolidation. The reason is that interest 
payments typically incorporate inflation expectations and therefore tend to be highly volatile in a high-
inflation environment. As this volatility is generally beyond the control of the authorities, the overall 
deficit clouds the picture of the extent of fiscal adjustment that is needed.
3 Against this background, it 
is interesting to note that in the recent episode of rising inflation in Argentina and Brazil in 2002, 
inflation has apparently led to higher (rather than lower) primary surpluses. This issue is further 
discussed in the overview paper by Moreno in this volume. 
General government budget 
In countries with a federal structure of government or large subnational governments, it is necessary to 
look beyond the central government to the fiscal positions of state and local governments. National 
fiscal authorities have often been forced to cover the losses and obligations of subnational 
governments, in particular in Latin America (see Section 5). The coverage of the general government 
in fiscal accounts has improved in recent years, but data on the activities of local governments are 
usually only available with long delays.
4 There are also difficulties with data consolidation, which may 
result in double counting. This creates considerable uncertainty for monetary policy. A related issue is 
that, despite availability of fiscal accounts on a general government basis and significant 
improvements in fiscal transparency, the budgetary process and political attention in most emerging 
economies remain focused on central government budgets.
5 This is a major concern for central banks 
in larger countries, where central government frequently accounts for less than two thirds of general 
government spending. On the other hand, to the extent that local governments are subject to tight 
borrowing limits, their activities need not affect monetary policy or GDP growth in a significant way. 
To verify to what extent it is important to include local governments in the assessment of fiscal 
positions, Graph 1 compares balances of the central government and the general government, 
measured in terms of GDP, during 2000-02. In Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Thailand and Turkey, the 
broader definition results in higher fiscal deficits (up to 4% of GDP in India). But in the Czech Republic, 
Peru, Poland and Russia, central and general government balances were of very similar size, while in 
Colombia, Mexico and South Africa the central government recorded somewhat larger deficits (in 
Korea, smaller surpluses) than the general government. 
Fortunately, limited time series data available indicate that central and general government balances 
generally move in tandem. In Asian countries, different deficit (in Korea, surplus) measures widened 
during 2000-01, and are projected to narrow slightly in 2002. In Latin America and central Europe, 
central and general government deficits have both increased since 2000, while in Russia the different 
surplus measures have narrowed since 2000. A panel regression of changes in general government 
balances as a function of central government balances and a constant suggests that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the central government deficit raises the general government deficit by an almost 
identical amount (1.09%).
6 Thus, the central banks that focus on the position of the central 
government would not seem to underestimate significantly the changes in the fiscal position of the 
general government. 
                                                       
3  Conversely, in a process of disinflation, when expectations lag and the risk premium remains high, the real interest burden 
tends to rise sharply. By looking at the overall balance one would thus conclude that greater fiscal effort is needed to reduce 
the overall deficit than by looking at the primary deficit. 
4  In central European countries, for example, final outturns of local government budgets are only known nine months after the 
end of the fiscal year. In Korea, fiscal spending and receipts of local governments will only be included in the consolidated 
fiscal balance beginning in 2003. 
5  The same is of course true in many industrial countries (eg the United States). 
6  The regression covers 12 emerging economies for which the data were available for the period 2000-02 (Brazil, China, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Korea, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia and Singapore). The estimated 
coefficient on the central government deficit is statistically significant at the 1% test level. 
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 Graph 1 














BR CL CO MX PE IN KR PH TH CZ HU PL RU ZA TR
Central government overall balance
General government                
 
BR = Brazil;  CL = Chile;  CO = Colombia;  MX = Mexico;  PE = Peru;  IN = India;  KR = Korea;  PH = Philippines;  TH = Thailand; 
CZ = Czech Republic; HU = Hungary; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; ZA = South Africa; TR = Turkey. 
1  As a percentage of GDP; average 2000-02. 
Sources: IMF; central banks. 
Other fiscal activities 
Central banks in emerging economies are increasingly using more comprehensive public sector 
accounts in their analyses. Heightened attention to such indicators has resulted not only from greater 
availability of fiscal data, but also from the realisation that fiscal accounts often exclude extensive 
quasi-fiscal activities and contingent liabilities of government and public sector institutions (see the 
Appendix for a taxonomy of fiscal risks).
7 The scope of fiscal activities that remain outside government 
budgets is of considerable importance for central banks because it is difficult to conduct short-run 
monetary policy without knowing the fiscal position. However, data on such activities are generally not 
provided to central banks on a regular basis. As a result, for many central banks the margin of 
uncertainty about the government’s fiscal position often amounts to several per cent of GDP. The 
following examples illustrate that any analysis of a country's fiscal position is far from complete if it 
overlooks the obligations the government has taken on outside its budgetary system: 
•   Measured fiscal balances in many Latin American countries during the first half of the 1990s 
looked better than they really were because they included privatisation receipts “above the 
line” but did not show liabilities such as pension arrears that were later partly recognised; 
•   In the Czech Republic, Mexico and Russia sizeable short-term public sector obligations were 
hidden in the balance sheets of weak financial institutions under government control; 
•   The crises in Asia, Russia and Turkey have shown that when the stability of a country’s 
financial system is at risk, markets usually expect the government to provide financial 
support that far exceeds its legal obligation; 
•   Many emerging economies rely on guarantees, extra-budgetary funds and state 
development banks as a non-transparent substitute for budgetary subsidies and for 
bypassing budgetary ceilings on government consumption and investment expenditure. One 
example is Mexico’s public works programme Pidiregas (Projects with a deferred impact on 
public expenditure recording), worth an estimated 4% of GDP. It is financed with funds 
raised internationally under the guarantee of the federal government. Spending under this 
                                                       
7  The paper by Hawkins on central bank balance sheets in this volume discusses how governments may influence the major 
components of central bank accounts through their quasi-fiscal activities. 
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 programme is not registered “above the line” until the project is finished and received by the 
public sector. 
•   China is another striking example of the importance of the broader public sector for the 
assessment of the fiscal position. The official data show that China’s state budget deficit has 
hovered at relatively low levels (2-3% of GDP) over the last 20 years, even though fiscal 
activity extends well beyond the official state budget. Following the formal separation of 
state-owned enterprise finances from the budget, the government has used the banking 
system extensively to support state-owned enterprises, and a significant share of these 
loans has become non-performing. The loan losses of the state-owned banks, although not 
legally a liability of the government, would have to be covered by additional state resources 
in the future if deposit liabilities are to be honoured. If the government’s quasi-fiscal liabilities 
from the banking system were included, the broader fiscal deficit would be significantly larger 
(estimated at about 5-6% of GDP by the IMF), as would be the level of government debt.
8 
Table 1 indicates to what extent some of these non-traditional budgetary items are being accounted 
for in the fiscal accounts. Off-budget expenditure by various government-supported entities remains 
largely unaccounted for. Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Russia and Thailand estimate but do not include such expenditure in public sector accounts. Similarly, 
contingent liabilities are estimated but not included in public sector accounts in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland and South Africa. 
 
Table 1 
Accounting for special items 
Off-budget expenditure 
 
Estimated but not included in the 
accounts 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru,
1 Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Thailand 
Not quantified  Chile, Czech Republic 
Contingent liabilities   
Shown as financing or a balance 
sheet item 
Indonesia, Russia 
Estimated but not included in the 
accounts 
Brazil,
2 Chile, Colombia, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, South Africa
3 
Not quantified  Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand 
Government asset sales   
Shown as budget revenue or in 
government income statement 
Argentina, Chile,
4 China, Hong Kong, India,
5 Malaysia, Mexico, 
Thailand, Turkey 
Special item in budget revenue or 
government income statement 
Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Philippines, Singapore,
6 South Africa
7 
Shown as financing or item in 
government balance sheet 
Argentina, Colombia, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Israel, Peru, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa,
8 Turkey 
1  Included  in  budgetary  accounts.   
2    Included in the debt calculation and projections.     
3  Actual  audited  data.   
4  Only 
capital  gains.   
5  Proceeds  from  disinvestments  in public sector undertakings.     
6    Included under capital receipts in the 
budget.   
7  Disposal of assets (ordinary).   
8  Disposal of assets (privatisation). 
Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
                                                       
8  Recognising the stock of non-recoverable bank loans, estimated at between 50–75% of GDP at end-2000 (of which an 
amount equivalent to 15½% of GDP has been transferred to asset management companies), would raise public debt to 
75-100% of GDP as of end-2000; see IMF (2002a). 
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 Table 1 does not reveal considerable variation regarding the types of off-budget expenditure and 
contingent liabilities that are being accounted for. Most countries identify ex post at least some of what 
had previously been contingent liabilities in their fiscal accounts; examples would be costs associated 
with banking failures or the need to clean up liabilities of entities being privatised. But ex ante 
coverage rarely extends to implicit direct liabilities such as future healthcare, pension and social 
security obligations of the government.
9 Central European countries often exclude one-off transition-
related expenditure (eg transitional costs of pension reform in Poland) in order to arrive at a measure 
of the budget deficit that is relevant for projecting a deficit reduction trajectory ahead of entry into 
European monetary union (see Section 4). 
The last part of Table 1 shows how countries account for proceeds from privatisation, an asset item 
that has become increasingly important for the assessment of fiscal positions over the past decade. 
Many Asian countries still include proceeds of government asset sales in budget revenue, ie “above 
the line” rather than as a financing item. Most emerging economies, however, distinguish government 
asset sales as a special item in the budget, or account for it as a financing item (ie “below the line”). It 
should also be noted that covering the activities of public corporations in public sector accounts is not 
always straightforward. Many public corporations are run like private companies and their shares are 
publicly traded (eg national petroleum companies). Most countries consider only investments of such 
firms as government capital spending. 
An issue of particular concern for central banks in highly indebted economies is how to disclose the 
information on contingent liabilities to the markets. There is a feeling among many central bankers that 
disclosure standards for emerging economies have become more stringent than for advanced market 
economies in recent years. Most central banks agree that appropriate accounting of contingent 
liabilities (such as local government borrowing, extra-budgetary funds and losses of state-owned 
enterprises and banks) is necessary in order to provide the right incentives to policymakers and 
borrowers. However, disclosure of previously unrecorded liabilities may be misinterpreted (Why is the 
government revealing the “skeletons in the closet” now? Is there more to come?), and sometimes 
gives speculators an idea of vulnerable points to attack.
10 Markets in particular view sudden jumps in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio as a sign of debt sustainability problems (see below). There is thus an incentive 
to reveal contingent liabilities slowly or not at all. One way to avoid such jumps in expenditure is to 
include items such as loan guarantees in the budget at the time they are approved rather than when 
they come due. On the other hand, central banks that have dealt extensively with different contingent 
liabilities feel that one should not wait for a crisis to recognise such liabilities - if markets had not paid 
attention to contingent liabilities before a crisis, they would certainly do so afterwards. 
In summary, although central banks and fiscal authorities in emerging economies are for the most part 
aware of the need to look beyond the narrow central government budget, their assessments of the 
fiscal positions of the general government and the public sector are still far from comprehensive. An 
additional problem is that the budget-making process typically retains a one-year focus in most 
countries - in particular, line ministries’ concerns rarely extend beyond the current fiscal year. Multi-
year fiscal frameworks have been developed mostly in the context of IMF-supported programmes 
(Indonesia, Korea, Turkey) or EU accession (central Europe), or have been in place as part of 
narrower budgeting (Hong Kong, Singapore) or planning exercises (India), rather than as part of a 
comprehensive macroeconomic framework. 
At the same time, one should be aware of the fact that different policy questions call for different 
measures of fiscal position. If, for instance, the question is how to finance the fiscal deficit, it is 
appropriate to exclude from public sector accounts entities such as fully funded pension schemes or 
the state-owned enterprises that are not likely to be bailed out by the government. If the main issue is 
the macroeconomic impact of changes in fiscal positions, then it is appropriate to include pension fund 
activities because they often affect total liquidity by depositing their receipts with the central bank or 
the banking system, which affects money supply. If the policy concern is resource allocation, then it is 
necessary to include the state enterprises as they could crowd out the private sector. 
                                                       
9  With the exception of New Zealand, most industrial countries do not account for such items, either. 
10  It has been argued, for instance, that one could not rely on market analysts to interpret the information on quasi-fiscal 
activities correctly. Even with the IMF’s SDDS there had been misinterpretations of the data, with negative consequences 
for some governments. Harmonisation of information was therefore not sufficient; one also needed to educate the markets. 
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 3. Debt  sustainability 
Monetary authorities in emerging economies are specially interested in the issue of debt sustainability 
at the general government level. One major reason is the necessity to conduct coherent 
macroeconomic policies: how far can monetary policy be pursued independently over time if the 
government debt service requirements are mounting uncontrollably? Central bankers may thus be 
willing to consider the current fiscal position, as noted above, but also to assess its medium-term 
implications and in particular whether the public debt looks sustainable. This criterion can be 
theoretically defined as the ability of the government to service its liabilities in the long run. However, 
this concept is not an objective one since it depends in practice on market expectations, which can 
change suddenly and markedly. To be sure, lots of countries - including advanced economies - have 
been subject to much concern when risk premia quickly changed. But this issue is of particular interest 
in emerging economies, where debt dynamics have more often been unstable. Moreover, fiscal 
deterioration has been a key factor triggering financial crisis in several emerging economies, although 
with different intensity across countries. 
Public debt sustainability and the conduct of monetary policy 
Financial markets are less mature and stable in emerging than in advanced economies: real interest 
rates are thus considerably higher; economic developments are more volatile; and risk management 
technology may not be well developed. These circumstances have been the by-product of three 
fundamental changes: (a) the discontinuation of financing of deficits by the monetary authorities - a 
recent and striking example of this being India since 1998; (b) the deregulation of interest rate 
regimes, implying that public debt has increasingly to be served at market-determined rates; and 
(c) the relaxation of capital controls, which has increased the exposure of emerging markets to sudden 
shifts in international investors’ risk aversion. Certainly, these changes have mostly been welcome, as 
they helped to bring down inflation and to improve the functioning of these economies. Nevertheless, 
these circumstances have made the issue of public debt sustainability of particular importance for the 
conduct of monetary policy in emerging market countries. 
First, a deteriorating fiscal situation can directly affect financial conditions. This is obviously linked to 
the relatively limited size of the bond markets, where the government sector is by far the largest 
borrower - and sometimes the only significant one for external funds. In these conditions, substantial 
pressures on interest rates and exchange rates can result from an increase in public borrowing. 
Moreover, the size of these effects is uncertain, and their signs may depend on the amplitude of fiscal 
deterioration. For instance, recent developments in central Europe have shown that a moderate 
increase in the budget deficit can result in an appreciating currency due to higher domestic interest 
rates. In contrast, a larger fiscal deterioration could lead to an upward adjustment in risk premium, 
leading to both sharply higher interest rates and a marked exchange rate depreciation (see below). 
Second, public debt sustainability and financial markets can interact indirectly. Even without any 
increase in government borrowings, concerns about the fiscal outlook could affect general confidence, 
for instance when investors suddenly come to believe - wrongly or not - that debt dynamics are not 
sustainable over the medium term. This could lead to higher risk premia and trigger unexpected 
movements in currencies and interest rates, raising the risk of a financial crisis. 
Third, public finance fragility is often considered a warning indicator, ie a sign of other - and perhaps 
hidden - fragilities in the rest of the economy. Hence, markets attach specific importance to fiscal 
credibility when judging the soundness of macroeconomic indicators. For instance, they tend to be 
less tolerant of current account deficits if the country is characterised by large fiscal fragilities. Or they 
will scrutinise more rigorously the health of the corporate and banking sectors. Moreover, worries 
about public finances can jeopardise institutional commitments and make them unsustainable. For 
instance, fixed exchange rate arrangements will not look credible and can be attacked in case of fiscal 
profligacy. Such “spillover” effects played a critical role in triggering the collapse of Turkey's exchange 
rate regime in 2001. 
The confidence channel may also play a significant role when markets perceive the fiscal position as 
an indicator of the “real” strength of authorities’ commitments, which could be fundamentally 
sustainable but lack enough credibility. For example, the EU accession countries that would like to join 
EMU have committed themselves to fiscal discipline. For the time being, public deficits can be 
financed relatively easily, as financial markets anticipate convergence of long-term interest rates with 
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 those in EMU. But a further degradation of their fiscal position, although “sustainable”, could be 
perceived as a sign of weakening commitment, in particular in the light of the structural problems that 
still have to be solved as part of EU membership requirements. 
More importantly perhaps, fiscal soundness is often a key element of market assessments about the 
ability of monetary policy to remain independent from political pressures. Thus, perceptions that a 
loose fiscal policy might eventually dominate a credible monetary policy can indirectly add to pressure 
on current interest rates. In Argentina, for instance, the difficulties faced by the central government in 
trying to curb spending by provincial or local authorities before the 2001-02 crisis might have affected 
market perceptions of the independence of monetary policy. 
These aspects of fiscal sustainability not only affect financial conditions, but also have in turn an 
impact on output and inflation performance and thus interfere with the conduct of monetary policy. For 
instance, concerns about public debt sustainability in Brazil in 2002 led to a rise in interest rates and to 
currency depreciation, causing weaker growth but also inflationary pressures in spite of a relatively 
muted exchange rate pass-through. Systemic risks can also trigger an explicit response from 
monetary authorities, as central banks could adopt a stricter stance to counterbalance the degradation 
of investor sentiment. The central banks may also remain cautious with interest rates if they feel that 
the government has underestimated fiscal risks. They might even try to act pre-emptively to prevent a 
self-fulfilling deterioration in market expectations.
11 
A simple approach to assessing public debt sustainability 
The basic concept of solvency is a good starting point for any debt sustainability analysis, although it 
may be deficient in many ways. It states that the present value of future fiscal surpluses must equal 
the stock of the outstanding net public debt, ie that over time there is no debt left. Public debt is thus 
considered as non-sustainable if solvency is not respected, assuming ex ante no change in policies. 
However, such an assessment is not an easy task, not least because a sufficient record of historical 
data as well as some stability in public finance indicators is required. Meanwhile, several technical 
assumptions have to be made, and studies on industrial countries have often led to ambiguous 
conclusions. Such difficulties are likely to be even greater for emerging economies. 
In practice, the most obvious indicator to focus on is the ratio of net public debt to GDP.
12 For fiscal 
policies to look sustainable, the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio needs to be bounded, ie it should not 
grow without limit. The dynamics of debt also matter. If the “sustainable” level of debt is well above its 
current level, the country could theoretically experience high fiscal deficits for a long time. But such 
developments have often been perceived as unsustainable by investors, raising the risk of a crisis. In 
contrast, a high debt level could be perceived as sustainable if it is decreasing. In Russia, a shrinking 
debt-to-GDP ratio has recently improved markets’ perceptions of sustainability, although memories of 
government default are still fresh.
13 
All in all, there is strong evidence that financial markets react adversely when the following two 
conditions exist in tandem: (a) the public debt is growing rapidly; and (b) the level of debt in relation to 
GDP is considered as “high”. An easy way to summarise these two conditions is to calculate the 
government budget balance that is required to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio over a given horizon. 
This kind of assessment generally relies on the view that current policies will be maintained and that 
growth in the economy will converge to its steady state rate. Under some simplistic technical 
assumptions,
14 this leads to the following condition: 
b* ≈ – d (g + π)  (1) 
                                                       
11  For instance, negative sentiment ex ante, despite no evidence that public debt is unsustainable, could lead to higher interest 
payments, larger deficits, and finally an ex post fiscal degradation. 
12  Because of the lack of data, following calculations are made using gross (and not net) public debt. 
13  Another factor suggesting that the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not a sufficient indicator of public debt sustainability per 
se is that this ratio can change dramatically following changes in the methodology of national accounts, in particular with 
respect to the measurement of informal activity. 
14  In particular, both g and π must be well below unity. 
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 where b* is the government budget balance (as a ratio to GDP) needed to stabilise the debt-to-GDP 
ratio,
15 d, g the real growth rate and π the inflation rate (GDP deflator). Both g and π are usually the 
“potential” rates expected under reasonable medium-term economic prospects. When the debt ratio is 
on a growing trend - ie when the actual budget deficit (–b) is higher than the sustainable deficit (–b*) - 
the gap between b* and b indicates the budgetary effort required to stabilise the debt ratio. One can 
also look at the implied conditions for the primary budget (b excluding interest payments or bp), 
since (1) can be rewritten as: 
bp* ≈ d (i – π – g) ≈ d (r – g)  (2) 
where bp* is the government primary budget balance needed to stabilise the debt,
16 i the average 
nominal interest rate applied to the debt and r the corresponding real rate (i*d is thus the interest 
payments). A third indicator can be the rise in taxes required to stabilise the debt ratio, described as 
the “tax gap”. 
This approach underscores the key parameters influencing the dynamics of debt. For instance, 
Graph  2 shows how debt dynamics change when real interest rates rise. To conclude, debt 
sustainability is greater when debt ratios and real interest rates are low, and when the pace of 
economic growth and the primary budget balance are high. 
Graph 2 





















1  As a percentage of GDP; calculated assuming GDP growth of 8% (nominal) and 4% (real) per year, and a public debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 0.6. 
Source: BIS calculations (see equations 1 and 2 in the text). 
Rapid changes in debt sustainability prospects 
The forward-looking nature of this approach to calculating debt sustainability makes it open to a wide 
range of economic uncertainties. In particular, a sustainable public debt is identified as one that is 
consistent with a stable equilibrium path of the economy. But underlying economic policies could 
change, not least because of political instability and credibility problems. Moreover, output growth has 
proved to be relatively volatile in emerging economies, implying that developments expected to be 
sustainable could suddenly turn less favourable. Such changes could result from adverse supply side 
shocks (eg changes in the terms of trade or natural disasters). Higher risk aversion in global financial 
                                                       
15  To be sure, all the values of b that are greater than b* respect the sustainability condition. 
16  The values of bp that are greater than bp* also respect the sustainability condition. 
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 markets has also played a significant role, as seen in 2002. Finally, while most public debt 
sustainability analyses rely on several independent assumptions for fiscal balances, interest rates and 
output growth, there are, in reality, interactions between policies and key economic variables (inflation, 
national savings, accumulation of capital, etc). For instance, poor fiscal prospects could push up risk 
premia, thus raising real interest rates and reducing debt sustainability prospects in a cumulative way. 
In contrast, there might also be positive feedback effects in some circumstances. For example, some 
EU accession countries have argued that current government deficits are essential for launching large 
infrastructure projects, which should improve potential growth prospects. 
Even countries with low levels of public debt can face a marked and sudden deterioration of their fiscal 
position during times of financial distress. Hence, debt sustainability assessments can change rapidly, 
with three factors having particularly large and sudden effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio: 
•   A protracted rise in interest rates, with the maturity structure of the debt playing a critical 
role. For instance, a short-term debt structure implies that the authorities will have to roll over 
their debt rapidly, leading to a sharp increase in interest payments. This has been an 
important factor in Turkey, where domestic public debt has an average maturity of only 
140 days, and in Brazil, where a significant part of the debt was indexed to short-term rates. 
•   A sharp depreciation in the exchange rate, which will directly lead to a surge in the debt-
to-GDP ratio if the amount of public liabilities denominated in foreign currencies is 
substantial, or if domestic debt has exchange rate indexed instruments. Hence, foreign 
currency borrowing entails substantial risks in terms of debt sustainability, not least because 
emerging markets can be affected by sharp and sudden shifts in exchange rates. For 
instance, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentina was lower than in several other economies 
(emerging as well as industrial) prior to the 2001-02 crisis, but it soared after the collapse of 
the peso. 
•   A sudden recognition of unrecorded public liabilities, for instance when the government 
has explicitly or implicitly guaranteed the debt of other agents. Even in Southeast Asia, 
where countries had generally maintained a track record of fiscal discipline before the 
1997-98 crisis, the issue of public debt sustainability arose as implicit state guarantees in the 
corporate or the banking sector emerged. And in Brazil, it is now assumed that the 
recognition of already existing hidden liabilities (so-called “skeletons”) could lead to a rise in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio of around 10 percentage points in the current decade. 
To be sure, such sudden increases in the debt level will not automatically signify poor sustainability 
prospects. For instance, Asian public debts have generally been considered sustainable despite a 
sharp surge after the 1997-98 crisis, which was mainly seen as a one-off event. Moreover, higher 
debts were in some cases a consequence of a quick recapitalisation of financial institutions, which was 
indeed welcome in order to clean up weak balance sheets and allow a resumption of bank lending. 
Abandoning an unsustainable exchange rate regime can also improve growth prospects and mitigate 
fiscal worries in turn. This seems to have been the case for Brazil in the immediate aftermath of the 
1999 devaluation. 
The need for a broader range of indicators 
These comments imply that a thorough assessment of public debt sustainability in emerging 
economies has to take into account the possibility of sudden adverse shocks. In assessing the 
underlying health (and potential exposures) of the public finances, a number of indicators are often 
looked at by central banks: 
•  The  depth and liquidity of domestic financial markets. This is a key factor allowing stable 
domestic financing conditions for government borrowings, and also in reducing the need for 
external funds in difficult times. India has taken various measures since the early 1990s to 
widen and deepen the domestic market for government securities. Characteristics of the 
holders of the debt can also become critical, for instance whether they are domestic or 
foreign lenders. The former are often captive investors in terms of portfolio management, 
while non-residents are sensitive to swings in global liquidity conditions and in risk appetite 
for the entire emerging market asset class. 
•  The  structure of the debt. If markets were complete and efficient, the composition of debt 
would not matter in the determination of interest rates. In practice, this is not the case. 
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 Moreover, attempts to keep debt servicing costs low could justify a preference for issuing 
particular assets. For instance, as the yield curve steepens, long-term borrowing becomes 
more expensive, and the government might be tempted to shorten maturities or to rely more 
on floating rate debt. If short-term rates subsequently have to be raised more than initially 
expected, this would raise the risk to sustainability in the longer run. On balance, it is 
assumed that debts of longer maturity are safer in terms of refinancing risk. For instance, 
public debt is quite high in Indonesia, but interest payments are relatively stable because of 
a rather long maturity structure. Meanwhile, the more public liabilities are denominated in 
foreign currencies and the lower is the ratio of exports to GDP, the higher is the risk to debt 
sustainability in case of a significant depreciation of the domestic currency. 
•  The  quality of public revenues and expenditures. On the expenditure side, upward 
pressures can result from factors such as indexation rules or significant discretionary 
spending power at the lower levels of the government. On the revenue side, a relatively high 
dependency on specific sectors (oil, tourism) can lead to volatility in tax revenues. 
Meanwhile, authorities may have only limited capacity to generate additional revenues if the 
country has a narrow tax base, a large grey economy or a weak tax administration. These 
characteristics might adversely affect debt sustainability prospects by impeding fiscal 
adjustment in case of adverse shocks. 
•  The  current public deficit. The higher the current budget deficit, the less sustainable is the 
public debt. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated analysis may be required to determine 
whether a deteriorating fiscal position is mainly the result of temporary cyclical developments 
or more permanent structural changes. Other elements, such as privatisation receipts or the 
possible use of off-budget sources of funding - such as extra-budgetary funds, state 
agencies and public enterprises - should also be looked at (see Section 2). 
•  The  track record of the fiscal authorities. A long period of fiscal discipline helps to foster 
government credibility, so that markets can be more tolerant of a temporary increase in debt 
ratios. An important point in this context is whether multi-year fiscal frameworks are in place, 
allowing pre-announced and transparent rules to fix market expectations. For instance, 
Poland has a commitment to keep the national public debt under a constitutional limit of 60% 
of GDP (see below). 
•  Implicit  or  potential public liabilities. A forward-looking approach to debt sustainability 
should consider potential liabilities, in particular the risk of a systemic banking crisis requiring 
large government assistance. Other potential or implicit liabilities may arise from off-budget 
fiscal operations, implicit state guarantees in the corporate sector, or future pension liabilities 
set to emerge in pay-as-you-go retirement schemes. Another example is the so-called 
“transformation institutions” in central Europe. So far, privatisation revenues have covered 
their losses, but they are expected to accumulate sizeable debts in the future. 
To conclude, three points emerge from the experience of emerging market economies. First, the level 
of debt at which sustainability becomes a problem can differ over time and across countries. 
Moreover, the exact threshold at which a country becomes vulnerable to default seems highly 
dependent on market sentiment and resulting changes in interest rates or exchange rates. 
Second, given the extent of these uncertainties, it is important to assess thoroughly the risks to debt 
sustainability, including looking at different stress-testing scenarios. For instance, the paper in this 
volume by Goldfajn assumes several risks to fiscal prospects before concluding that the Brazilian 
public debt is sustainable under “reasonable” assumptions. Even so, this approach might 
underestimate the likelihood of default, since “unreasonable” assumptions might still materialise. 
Third, government budgetary projections have often shown a tendency to “official optimism” and 
assigned a small weight to the possibility of unexpected shocks. It would be desirable that fiscal 
authorities build in some room for manoeuvre, for instance by looking at scenarios that focus on recent 
developments of the debt sustainability criterion. A sharp increase in the difference between the 
current budget deficit and the one that is required for stabilising the debt ratio could serve as a useful 
warning signal, even though both the level of debt and its rate of change might look “sustainable”. 
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 Table 2 

















China 15  1.7  0  0  1.5 
India 67  –0.8  5  6  3.2 
Indonesia 92  –8.6  55  88  10.3 
Korea 19  –4.0  25  25  2.3 
Malaysia 44  3.0  17  20  0.4 
Philippines 59  –0.6  48  66  –0.7 
Singapore 91  –2.8  ...  76  3.4 
Thailand 22  0.9  36  43  3.0 
          
Argentina 53  0.6  97  43  3.9 
Brazil 56  2.6  46  96  3.7 
Chile 14  –0.4  ...  ...  –0.6 
Colombia 44  1.8  54  83  5.0 
Mexico 34  –0.8  28  72  –2.8 
Peru 45  0.4  85  98  –0.7 
          
Czech Republic  17  1.2  ...  63  0.7 
Hungary 49  –7.2  30  64  –6.0 
Poland 40  1.5  35  66  –2.6 
Russia 50  –25.0  88  89    0.4
7 
Turkey 36  –2.8  58  99  3.0 
          
Israel 95  –1.3  27  78  –1.7 
Saudi Arabia  94  –4.9  ...  ...   2.0
8 
South Africa  44  –3.9  15  25  –1.1 
1  Gross, as a percentage of GDP.   
2  Defined as the difference between the budget balance needed to stabilise the debt and 
the actual budget balance, average 2000-02; a positive sign implies that the actual budget balance is too low (the deficit is 
too high) to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio.   
3  As a percentage of total public debt.   
4  Defined as the percentage of debt 
denominated in or linked to foreign currencies.   
5  Defined as the percentage of floating rate debt or with maturity less than 
one  year.   
6    Average annual change in the debt-to-GDP ratio during the period 1995-2001, in percentage points.     
7  Average over the period 1997-2001.   
8  Average over the period 1996-2001. 
Sources: National data; BIS estimates. 
 
Outlook for debt sustainability in emerging economies 
One important issue for monetary policymakers is whether they have enough reliable data to assess 
public debt sustainability. To this end, Table 2 and Graph 3 show some rough indicators: the current 
level of debt, its recent dynamics, the debt sustainability criterion, and some indicators of debt fragility 
in the case of interest rates and currency risks. 
These indicators clearly show that highly indebted countries are in different positions with respect to 
debt sustainability. For instance, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey show large government liabilities in 
2002 as well as a growing trend in the public debt. Some of them have already experienced problems 
of debt solvency and prospects for other heavily indebted countries could become more acute should 
adverse shocks occur. Nevertheless, there are other countries where public debt is clearly too high but 
where the debt sustainability criterion is relatively favourable, suggesting that sustainability problems 
could moderate in the near future if the current fiscal stance is maintained. One example of this 
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 second group is Indonesia, where public debt increased sharply from a pre-crisis level of around 23% 
of GDP to almost 100% of GDP. Finally, some countries with a large public debt have limited currency 
and interest rate exposure (eg India). 
Among  low-indebted countries, the picture is also mixed. Some countries fail to meet the 
sustainability criterion, suggesting that the current debt-to-GDP ratio is low but rising, and that fiscal 
worries could rapidly increase in case of adverse events. In particular, public debt in China is 
moderate but would grow in the future, should hidden liabilities in the banking and corporate sectors 
be recognised. In contrast, the situation of Korea and Mexico looks relatively favourable: the debt-
to-GDP ratio is rather low and decreasing, while the debt sustainability criterion suggests that the 
authorities have significant room for manoeuvre in case of unexpected shocks. 
4. Fiscal  rules 
Fiscal rules can be defined as specific, binding constraints on the government’s range of policy options 
in areas such as the budget balance, debt, spending or taxation. Policy rules or guidelines that are not 
legislated are not considered to be fiscal rules in a narrow sense because they do not impose binding 
constraints on present or future governments, although they may still influence their decisions; see 
Kennedy et al (2001). This section addresses four issues that have been important from central banks’ 
perspective: the rationale for fiscal rules, their design, experiences with their use and conditions for 
their effectiveness. 
Rationale 
Underlying most fiscal rules is a sense that present or future governments may not be willing or able to 
implement disciplined fiscal policy measures without external pressure. Indeed, the need to establish 
credibility and, hence, adopt fiscal rules is greatest when initial conditions are problematic. While in 
theory a discretionary policy can achieve the same outcomes as fiscal rules, and should in fact be 
superior because it allows greater flexibility, in practice electoral pressure may lead politicians to adopt 
a short time horizon. This could result in less disciplined and even unsustainable policies over time. 
Following these arguments, the primary usefulness of a well designed, appropriately implemented set 
of permanent fiscal rules is that they establish a depoliticised framework for fiscal policy, much like the 
depoliticisation of monetary policy under successful inflation targeting; see Kopits (2001). With 
information on macroeconomic prospects being widely available, the budget balance and the level of 
expenditure would be determined by rules, and only the relative spending priorities and the tax 
structure would become subject to legislative and public debate. This makes fiscal rules potentially 
highly attractive to the emerging economies, particularly those wishing to establish a reputation of 
fiscal rectitude, or those wishing to design a more efficient structure of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
Despite the obvious attractions, the use of fiscal rules has also raised several concerns. The main one 
is that rules may be overly restrictive and limit a government’s ability to engage in countercyclical fiscal 
policy when required. The difficulties some euro area countries are currently experiencing in meeting 
the 3% budget deficit norm of the Stability and Growth Pact are an illustration. To be functional, 
legislation must therefore be written in such a way that it provides some flexibility. But at the same 
time, the rule should not be so flexible as to become non-binding. In order to be credible, fiscal rules 
should be viewed as permanent. And in order to be transparent, the rules should be defined in terms 
of fiscal indicators that are easy to monitor and cannot be manipulated easily. These desirable 
characteristics of fiscal rules are not easy to fulfil because they involve complex trade-offs. 
Furthermore, when a government has a margin for “creative accounting”, the imposition of fiscal rules 
may entail an additional trade-off between window-dressing (which is costly in the long run but can 
help win votes in the short run) and real fiscal adjustment (which is costly in the short run but creates 
long-term benefits); see Milesi-Feretti (2000). 
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 Graph 3 
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1  As a percentage of GDP.   
2  Defined as the government budget balance needed to stabilise the (gross) debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics; national data; BIS estimates. 
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 Design 
The majority of emerging economies (including China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, 
Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey) use no formal fiscal rules to bind 
the national government. However, the budget-making process implicitly involves some controls on the 
spending and borrowing decisions of the executive branch of the government. For instance, the size of 
the deficit, levels of expenditure and borrowings must be approved annually by the legislative branch 
in most countries. In addition, they may be part of an agreed medium-term fiscal plan (Indonesia, 
Thailand, central European countries). In several Asian economies, this approach reflects a history of 
fiscal discipline and, perhaps, caution with regard to fiscal policy innovations in general. 
Formal fiscal rules that are embedded in legislation have been used in only a few emerging 
economies. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR requires the government to “follow the principle of 
keeping expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a 
fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its GDP”. 
Argentina and Peru both adopted fiscal responsibility laws in 1999. The laws set ceilings for the 
deficit of the central government and the growth of expenditure, and established fiscal stabilisation 
funds financed through tax revenues. The intention was to ensure savings in periods of boom that 
could be used in times of recession. The Argentine law also prohibited the creation of off-budget items, 
while the Peruvian law set a limit on the increase in public debt. 
Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law, enacted in 2000, applies to all levels of government. It prohibits 
financial support operations among different levels of government, sets limits on personnel 
expenditures, and requires that limits on the indebtedness of each level of government be set by the 
senate. Annual fiscal targets have to be set within a three-year framework. The law also establishes 
rules to control public spending in election years. 
The central government in Poland is bound by two rules: the nominal deficit in the approved annual 
budget cannot be exceeded without going back to parliament, and the national public debt has a 
constitutional limit of 60% of GDP. Special prudential measures are triggered when public debt 
exceeds 50% of GDP. Specifically, the deficits of subnational governments must be lowered, the 
council of ministers must submit a fiscal consolidation plan to parliament, and issuing of new state 
guarantees is limited; see OECD (2002c). 
Several emerging market economies follow more specialised rules. Singapore requires presidential 
approval if the current government wishes to use reserves accumulated by a previous government, or 
if the current government needs to spend more than 50% of the net investment income earned during 
a fiscal year. In Russia, the budget law sets a limit on the deficit: the deficit should be less than the 
sum of fixed investment and interest payments. Many emerging economies have also passed or are 
considering budget or other legislation requiring the government to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit 
over the medium term (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, EU accession countries). Chile is a particularly 
interesting case in that, from 2001, the central government has to generate a 1% surplus on its 
structural fiscal balance. 
Experiences 
Empirical research on the effectiveness of fiscal rules in industrial countries is inconclusive, as most 
rules at the national level have not yet passed the test of time. In a survey of empirical research on 
OECD countries, Kennedy et al (2001) argue that some of the euro area countries might not have 
achieved fiscal consolidation without the strict rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty. There is also 
evidence that expenditure ceilings embodied in the Budget Enforcement Act have played a significant 
role in reducing spending of the US federal government; see IMF (2001b). However, in several OECD 
countries major improvements in structural fiscal balances were made during the 1990s without fiscal 
rules. Moreover, the adoption of fiscal rules in New Zealand did not prevent recent slippage relative to 
long-term fiscal goals. 
The empirical evidence is even more limited for the emerging market economies given the recent 
introduction of such rules. Fatás and Mihov (2002) construct a measure of discretionary fiscal policy 
for a number of emerging economies. Based on this measure they provide evidence that discretionary 
fiscal policies amplify business cycle fluctuations and reduce the rate of growth, while rules-based 
fiscal policies help to lower output volatility and positively affect growth. For the countries studied in 
this paper, the limited evidence available to date is mixed. 
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 Hong Kong established an exemplary record of budgetary performance during 1984-97, when it 
operated under informal fiscal rules very similar to those stipulated in the Basic Law. However, since 
1998 the deficit avoidance rule has been breached in every year. Persistent high fiscal deficits 
(projected to reach 6% of GDP in fiscal year 2003) have even raised questions about the robustness 
of Hong Kong’s linked exchange rate system, despite high fiscal reserves and the absence of public 
debt. 
In Argentina, the deficit ceilings were exceeded in 1999 and 2000; in 2001 they were relaxed and the 
date at which a balanced budget should be achieved was shifted to 2005 (Table 3). However, the rule 
was effectively abandoned in 2002, when the economy plunged into deep crisis. Limits on the fiscal 
deficit set in Peru’s fiscal responsibility law have also been breached in every year since the law was 
adopted (formally, congress suspended the limits for 2001 and 2002).
17 
Brazil’s fiscal responsibility law seems to have been more successful so far. The primary surplus 
increased from 3½% of GDP in 2000 to 3.9% in 2002, even as the economic situation worsened 
(Table 4). Most of this improvement was achieved by reducing the deficit of the federal government 
and central bank, whereas the deficit of states and municipalities increased by almost 2% of GDP in 
2002. At the national level, the personnel expenditures were kept well below the legislated limit of 38% 
of current revenue in 2001. Moreover, the vast majority of municipalities complied with an equivalent 
limit (60% of current revenue) at their level. However, the primary surpluses have been achieved 
mainly on the basis of revenue increases rather than expenditure cuts; see Samuels (2002). In 
addition, most of these increases were temporary (such as the tax on financial transactions), requiring 
difficult renegotiation in congress before each extension of the tax. 
 
Table 3 
Argentina: compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law 
Deficit limits
1   
1999 Law  2001 Modification 
Observed 
1999 –1.9    –3.0 
2000 –1.1    –3.4 
2001 –0.5  –2.5  –5.5 
2002 0  –2.0  –2.2 
2003 0  –1.3   
2004 0  –0.9   
2005 0  0   
1  As a percentage of GDP. Limits refer to the central government. Values are estimated as the law established nominal 
ceilings for the deficit, not for the deficit/GDP ratio. 
Source: Braun and Tommasi (2002), p 7. 
 
In Poland, the nominal deficit rule has led to overly conservative revenue projections, the inclusion of 
spending reserves in the budget, and occasional payment arrears. It has also provided incentives to 
circumvent the limits through creative accounting, and to push expenditure off the central budget into 
extra-budgetary funds and various special purpose agencies.
18 On the other hand, the constitutional 
limit on public sector debt has been observed at all times. 
                                                       
17  The limits were set at 2% of GDP in 2000, 1½% in 2001, and 1% in 2002. In the event of actual or projected recession, the 
law allowed the deficit limit to be increased by up to 2% of GDP. 
18  The state budget represents only 40% of general government expenditure, while some 3,000 national and local government 
extra-budgetary funds represent a further 40%. The remainder is accounted for by the budgets of subnational governments. 
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 Poland’s experience has been echoed in some countries that do not use fiscal rules in the narrow 
sense, but rely instead on deficit, spending and borrowing limits in annual budgets. In Korea, 
governments in the past preferred to establish off-budget funds rather than issue bonds, as the latter 
would have been subject to the scrutiny of the national assembly. However, this was possible only 
because the general account exhibited surpluses sufficient to cover chronic deficits of special 
accounts and extra-budgetary funds. In Hungary, frustrations with the rigidity of budget procedures 
and legitimate concerns about the state of public infrastructure have led the authorities to finance an 
extensive road development programme through a state-owned development bank specially 




Brazil: public sector developments 
Percent of GDP 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 
Overall balance  –9.2 –4.6 –3.6 –4.6 
Federal government and central  bank  –6.9 –3.2 –2.1 –0.8 
States and municipalities  –2.4 –2.1 –2.0 –3.9 
State enterprises  0.1 0.8 0.6 0.0 
Primary balance  3.2 3.5 3.6 3.9 
Federal government and central  bank  2.4 1.9 1.8 2.4 
States and municipalities  0.2 0.6 0.9 0.8 
State enterprises  0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7 
Interest payments due  12.4 8.1 7.2 8.5 
Federal government and central  bank  9.3 5.1 3.9 3.1 
States and municipalities  2.6 2.7 2.9 4.6 
State enterprises  0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil; Institute of International Finance. 
 
Another country with mixed experience has been South Africa. On the positive side, a constitutional 
provision allowing the parliament to adjust the budget proposed by the government proved effective 
because the parliamentary budget committee had adequate knowledge of fiscal issues. The 
government’s medium-term horizon for fiscal policy, which gave fiscal policy some discipline without 
making it rules-based, also proved useful because markets could easily detect any deviation from 
medium-term targets. And the central government’s power to take over a province that is not 
managing its finances properly has been effective in reducing provincial overspending, given that a 
takeover would have been extremely embarrassing for provincial leadership. However, the provision 
on criminal sanctions for mismanagement of public institutions, although a priori desirable, had some 
unintended consequences. Many qualified individuals have became reluctant to accept positions as 
board members in state-owned enterprises, and government departments have become extremely 
cautious with spending, which has resulted in significant underspending. 
Conditions for effectiveness of fiscal rules 
These limited experiences do not clearly suggest conditions under which fiscal rules are likely to fail or 
succeed. In Hong Kong, one possible weakness has been the lack of sanctions for breaching the 
                                                       
19  The bank issued its own bonds and provided guarantees to commercial banks lending to contractors, while the scope of its 
activities was estimated at 8-9% of GDP; see OECD (2002a). Beginning in 2003, the bank is no longer involved in the 
financing of the road development programme. 
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 rules. In Brazil, for instance, penalties and sanctions for non-compliance were applied not only at 
institutional level but also to public officials under the so-called Fiscal Crimes Law, thus significantly 
strengthening the enforcement of the Fiscal Responsibility Law. But in South Africa, as noted above, 
sanctions for mismanagement of public institutions have led to avoidance of decisions on spending. 
In Argentina and Peru, the rules probably failed because of inherited fiscal fragilities, weak budgetary 
institutions, and ill-fated timing of the introduction of the rules (during the recession in 1999). More 
importantly, the experience of Argentina and Peru indicates that fiscal rules need to work over the 
entire business cycle in order to be effective. If there is a negative shock or a downturn in economic 
activity, deficit reduction targets can become excessively tight and attempts to satisfy them may 
exacerbate the downturn. Conversely, if there is a positive shock (eg an increase in the price of 
commodities that are exported) or a boom in economic activity, fiscal rules that set a limit on the size 
of the deficit would become relatively easy to comply with. The underlying fiscal position - eg large 
outstanding public debt - would thus not improve and the procyclical fiscal stance would accentuate 
the boom. Gavin et al (1996) argue that excessive spending during the booms and, hence, the 
incapacity to maintain surpluses in good times often sow the seeds of a fiscal crisis, although the crisis 
becomes evident only when the boom subsides.
20 Partly reflecting this concern, the Peruvian 
authorities revised the fiscal responsibility law in mid-2002, allowing for a transitional period to reach 
the medium-term deficit target following a recession, but requiring corrective measures when the fiscal 
programme goes off track in periods of positive growth. An alternative rule for countries with low debt 
levels could be to limit public debt rather than the budget deficit, so as to leave more room for 
countercyclical fiscal policy. 
In view of the procyclical bias of fiscal policies in many Latin American countries, Chile’s structural 
surplus rule deserves particular attention. The structural balance is estimated by removing the effects 
of variations in copper prices (by using a panel of experts to estimate the long-term price trend) and 
the economic cycle on revenues (by using revenue elasticity estimates and a measure of potential 
GDP). This rule is expected to force the government to run high surpluses during domestic booms and 
periods of high copper prices. Conversely, the rule allows moderate deficits during downturns and 
periods of low copper prices. The estimated budget deficits for 2001 and 2002 have in fact been 
consistent with the structural surplus rule.
21 
A further consideration is whether fiscal rules can be used to discipline fiscal policy at different levels 
of government. The failure of the fiscal responsibility law in Argentina has been attributed to the fact 
that the provincial governments were exempt from the law, ie they were only invited to adopt similar 
fiscal rules. While some provinces followed the rules, others did not. In contrast, Brazil introduced its 
Fiscal Responsibility Law as part of a comprehensive fiscal stabilisation plan, under which the 
government committed itself to generating a consolidated primary budget surplus for three years. The 
fiscal positions of subnational governments were made consistent with this overall goal. The federal 
and most state governments agreed to a debt restructuring plan, while extensive privatisation and 
closure of commercial banks owned by the states helped create an environment more conductive to 
fiscal discipline. 
A common reason for the failure of fiscal rules has been the lack of commitment to implement the 
rules. As pointed out in the political economy literature, in contrast to the private market, where 
shareholders can dismiss managers at any time and thus protect a firm’s reputational capital, in 
politics an election victory provides a multi-year franchise; see Schuknecht (2001). Since the 
electorate can do very little until the next election even if it feels cheated, some governments may 
choose to break the rules if they find it would not hurt them politically. Even governments that have 
established a reputation for tight fiscal policies may take the risk of losing that reputation if they think 
that short-term fiscal expansion is essential to win the next election. 
The potential failure of reputation as a disciplining device is an important reason why fiscal rules 
should be hard to amend or circumvent, ie designed so as to impose very high exit costs. Poland's 
positive experience with the constitutional limit on public debt illustrates this point. Another example is 
                                                       
20  Financial market failures may contribute to such procyclicality: there is evidence that spreads are procyclical, which means 
that deficits are financed relatively easily in periods of boom, while exacerbating negative debt dynamics in periods of 
recession; see Perry (2002). 
21  See the paper by Marshall in this volume; Ministry of Finance, Chile (2002); and Fiess (2002). 
BIS Papers No 20  27
 the Maastricht criteria for entry into European monetary union (EMU). These criteria are not part of 
EU membership requirements and new EU members are not expected to meet them until around 2007 
at the earliest. Nevertheless, fiscal policy in accession countries is being increasingly oriented towards 
satisfying a 3% norm for the deficit of the general government and a limit on total public debt of 60% of 
GDP. The reason is that fiscal deficits are currently very high in several accession countries (6-9% of 
GDP). Entering the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (so-called ERM II) 
with such a high deficit, with a view to reducing it below 3% in two years, could put pressure on central 
banks to keep short-term interest rates higher than in the euro area.
22 
As illustrated by the Hungarian experience in January 2003, this differential would attract short-term 
capital inflows and could well increase exchange rate volatility.
23 A particular concern would arise if the 
ambitious deficit reduction strategies were to go off track. Since non-residents are expected to become 
major buyers of newly issued public debt, given the promise of medium-term sustainability, such an 
event could lead to a sudden reversal of portfolio capital flows, causing the currency to depreciate 
sharply. The Hungarian experience in June 2003 partly illustrates this course of events. The accession 
countries have limited capacity to respond to large movements in capital flows and may therefore find 
it necessary to satisfy the Maastricht criteria from the moment their currencies enter ERM II. This will 
require substantial fiscal adjustment in the next few years. Mobilising support for such adjustment will 
be difficult, however, given the large public expenditure needs and the fact that the deficits can be 
financed relatively easily at the moment. 
5.  Intergovernmental fiscal relations 
The emerging market economies on average devolve a smaller proportion of public expenditure to 
subnational governments than do industrial countries (Graph 4). Nevertheless, as most major taxes 
are typically assigned to the central government, sizeable vertical imbalances (pre-transfer fiscal 
deficits) frequently emerge at the subnational level. There are also horizontal imbalances, since the 
revenue-raising capacity of subnational governments varies and different regions may face different 
cost and demand pressures as they attempt to meet their assigned expenditure responsibilities. As in 
industrial countries, the gap between revenue and spending in local jurisdictions in the emerging 
economies is met through intergovernmental transfers (grants and revenue sharing), borrowing by 
governments in deficit, or a combination of the two. 
Inappropriate design of intergovernmental fiscal relations has often led to macroeconomic imbalances 
and created major problems for monetary policy. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Russia have bailed 
out subnational governments when their deficits or arrears became unsustainable: see Ter-Minassian 
(1997). Brazil’s federal government set up debt restructuring operations three times between 1989 and 
1997 to support highly indebted state governments. In 1989, the federal government assumed 
BRL  11  billion of states’ external debt. In 1993, BRL 39 billion of states’ debt with financial 
intermediaries owned by the federal government was refinanced. In 1997, a programme was launched 
to restructure states’ bond debt; by 1999, BRL 87 billion had been refinanced; see OECD (2001a). 
The experiences of Argentina (Box 2) and China (Box 3) further illustrate the need to restrain and 
monitor closely subnational governments’ borrowing because of widespread expectations of central 
government bailouts. 
                                                       
22  Participation in ERM II without severe tension for at least two years is part of the exchange rate stability criterion for EMU 
membership. The remaining criteria pertain to inflation and interest rates. 
23  Short-term capital inflows of approximately EUR 4-5 billion (6-7% of GDP) entered Hungary within a few hours on 15 and 
16 January 2003. The inflows were fuelled by speculation that the 15% limit for appreciation of the forint above its central 
parity against the euro would be lifted. To quell the attack, the central bank cut policy rates by 200 basis points within two 
days, introduced temporary capital controls and intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market. 
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 Graph 4 
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AR = Argentina;  BR = Brazil;  CL = Chile;  CN = China;  CZ = Czech  Republic;  HU = Hungary;  IN = India;  MX = Mexico; 
PE = Peru; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; TH = Thailand; ZA = South Africa. 
1  Average for 2000-01, in percentages. 
Sources: National data. 
Box 2 
Monetary implications of provincial government deficits in Argentina 
Until 2001, central government in Argentina was responsible for 44% of total expenditure but collected 82% of 
total revenue. Provincial governments were responsible for 46% of total expenditure and municipalities for 
10%, but together they collected only 18% of total revenue. Debt issuance was more or less proportionate to 
revenue shares at different levels of government. Since mid-1998, adverse debt dynamics and deflation had 
led to rising nominal and real interest rates. This raised the cost of refinancing central government debt and led 
to rising unemployment. Many local governments at first tried to protect public sector employment by borrowing 
from the commercial banks they owned. This was especially the case in the Province of Buenos Aires, which 
borrowed heavily from a major commercial bank it owned. As private demand for credit declined with 
worsening recession, banks were initially willing to lend to provincial governments or invest in their bonds. 
However, they did so without appropriate risk weighting, keeping government loans and bonds on books at 
face value rather than market value. The banks thus accumulated large contingent liabilities and had to be 
recapitalised. 
When the state-owned banks could no longer lend to provincial governments, provinces started issuing quasi-
money, which was in essence equivalent to bonds and was used to pay provincial government workers. In the 
Province of Buenos Aires, even the central government accepted local quasi-money, patacones, for payment 
of national taxes. The central bank could in principle have replaced quasi-monies in circulation with its own 
bills. However, this would have created a severe balance sheet problem since the central bank would have 
ended up holding quasi-monies as an asset. 
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 Box 3 
China’s experience with intergovernmental fiscal relations 
During the 1980s, China’s central government controlled all tax legislative powers, but tax assignment and 
revenue sharing arrangements were to a large extent negotiated with the provinces. Revenue from certain 
taxes was designated as “central fixed revenue” and a portion of revenue from other taxes as “local fixed 
revenue”, with the remainder going into a pool of shared revenue. Most shared revenue was split according to 
formulae stipulated in fiscal contracts between the central government and provinces. The contracts typically 
fixed revenue transfers with respect to a base year, with annual increments agreed upon ex ante. The central 
government devolved considerable expenditure responsibilities as well as tax administration to local 
governments. 
Given these arrangements, local authorities had an incentive to concentrate on the local tax bases and, to the 
extent possible, shift the tax bases from those that had to be shared with the central government to those over 
which they had greater control. This involved promoting the growth of locally owned enterprises and granting 
generous tax reductions and exemptions in respect of indirect taxes (which had to be shared with the central 
government). The resources thus “saved” could be retained for local projects. These policies exerted a strong 
expansionary bias. When the local economy expanded, local tax revenue was boosted. As only a relatively 
small portion of additional revenue had to be shared with the central government, local spending tended to 
increase in periods of economic expansion, thus increasing the risk of overheating. The threat of 
macroeconomic instability could not restrain local spending plans because local governments did not have 
macroeconomic management responsibilities. Also, local governments that accumulated surpluses could 
worsen their bargaining position with the central government in negotiations for subsequent contracts. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations also served to weaken the implementation of monetary policy. The influence 
of The People’s Bank of China (PBC) as the central bank was circumscribed at the local levels by the 
dependency on local governments for housing, education and other benefits for PBC branch workers. The 
large number of PBC branches, which paralleled the administrative structure of the government, also tended to 
leave them vulnerable to local political intervention and to weaken headquarters’ control. For instance, 
pressures from local governments to permit local banks to extend credit beyond the planned ceilings had to be 
accommodated by base money creation, which triggered high inflation in the early 1990s. 
In response to these developments, relations between the central and local governments were thoroughly 
reformed in 1994. On the fiscal side, the central government began introducing a more transparent delineation 
of revenue sources for the central and local governments and established a national tax administration to 
collect all central and shared taxes. On the central banking side, the PBC shifted to a system of regional rather 
than provincial branches in an effort to dilute the influence of provincial authorities. On both fronts, reforms 
continue to evolve. 
Sources: Mihaljek (1998); Tseng et al (1994). 
 
These negative experiences have led governments and central banks in many countries to devise 
special rules on fiscal positions and borrowing of subnational governments (Table 5). Larger countries 
in particular limit the maximum size of deficits of subnational governments. And with the exception of 
India, none of the emerging economies in the sample allow local governments to borrow from central 
banks. Borrowing of subnational governments from commercial banks is subject to either quantitative 
limits or prudential regulations. Furthermore, the use of borrowed funds is typically restricted to capital 
expenditures (the so-called golden rule). In practice, however, it is often difficult to prevent 
governments from evading the golden rule by labelling certain current expenditures as investments. 
Moreover, there is evidence that governments often borrow to finance investments that do not have 
adequate rates of return. In Hungary, for instance, local governments have been freed from borrowing 
caps for housing development purposes. In an environment of increased bank competition, this has 
led commercial banks to become very active in the municipal credit market. 
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 Table 5 
Specification of rules on fiscal positions of subnational governments 
Rule on maximum size of deficit of 
subnational governments 
 
Existence of a rule  Brazil, China,
1 Czech Republic,
2 India, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey 
No explicit limit  Chile, Hungary, Korea, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Thailand  
Borrowing from central bank   
Not allowed  Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, 
Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey 
Allowed India
3 
Limit on borrowing from commercial 
banks 
 
Existence of a rule  Brazil,
4 China, Colombia,
3 Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, 
Israel,
5 Mexico,
4 Peru, Philippines, Turkey  
No explicit limit  Chile, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand  
Rules on use of borrowed funds   
Only for capital expenditure  Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, 
South Africa,
6 Thailand 
No explicit rules  Hungary, India, Korea, Peru, Russia, Turkey 
Limit on the annual issuance of debt   















No explicit limit  Chile, South Africa 
Limit on outstanding stock of debt   
Existence of a rule  Brazil, India, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey 
No explicit limit  Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, South Africa 
1    The rule refers to no deficit on current fiscal account.      
2    Local government guarantees or collateral must cover the 
planned deficit.   
3  Limited facility in order to meet temporary cash flow mismatch.   
4  Based on limits on net worth of banks.   
5  Subject to approval by the Ministry of the Interior.    
5  Short-term debt can be used for bridging finance.   
7  Based on 
payment capacity.   
8  Only for special purposes.   
9  Based on approval by central government. 
Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Virtually all the emerging economies set limits on the annual debt issuance or outstanding stock of 
debt of subnational governments. The limits are usually tied to the debt servicing capacity of local 
governments or macroeconomic (especially monetary and balance of payments) considerations. The 
restrictions may take a variety of forms, including setting annual (or more frequent) limits on the overall 
debt of individual jurisdictions; limits on external borrowing; reviewing and authorising individual 
borrowing operations (including their terms and conditions); and centralising all government borrowing, 
with onlending to subnational governments for approved purposes only (generally investment 
projects). In India, for instance, federal government approval is required for borrowing by the states if 
they have outstanding debt to the federal government, as is currently the case for virtually all the 
states. Only the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea and South Africa set no explicit limits on the 
outstanding stock of local government debt. 
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 Table 6 
Status of debt of subnational governments 
Guaranteed by central government   
Explicit guarantee  Brazil,
1 Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Poland,
2 Turkey
3 
Implicit or de facto guarantee  China, Israel, Philippines
2 
No guarantee  Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico,
4 Peru 
Debt to central government has been written 
off in the past 10 years 
 
Yes  Brazil, Colombia, Israel, Mexico, Russia, South Africa 
No  Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Thailand 
Provisions to compensate central government 
for the assumption of subnational debt 
 




No provisions  Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand 
1  For external debt.   
2  Limited guarantees by state treasury or other government agency.   
3  For limited amount of external 
debt.   
4  Except for the Federal District.   
5  Local debt guaranteed by the local shares of federal revenue must be registered.   
6  The central government can appropriate subnational shares of revenue or transfers. 
Sources: Central bank questionnaires; IMF, Reports on the observance of standards and codes; OECD, Economic surveys. 
 
Although appealing in principle, sole reliance on market discipline for government borrowing is unlikely 
to work in most circumstances. This is because one of the key conditions for its effectiveness - orderly 
and effective insolvency procedures for local government units - is rarely realised. Indeed, most 
national governments in emerging economies offer either explicit or implicit guarantees for debt of 
subnational governments (Table 6). Brazil, Colombia, Israel, Mexico, Russia and South Africa have 
written off portions of local government debt in the past. In most other emerging economies, central 
governments have restructured subnational government debt, often by assuming much of the debt on 
terms that were very favourable to local governments, ie without compensating central government for 
the assumption of subnational debt. Such bailouts are, of course, not unknown to industrial countries: 
in 1975 New York City went bankrupt and received USD 1.7 billion in federal loan guarantees before 
re-establishing solvency. The Czech Republic and Hungary seem to be the only countries in the 
sample where the national government let small local government units default on their debt without 
coming to their rescue; see OECD (2001b, 2002a). 
The importance of bank lending as a source of financing for subnational governments points to 
prudential regulation as an alternative way to control local government borrowing. However, there is 
no empirical evidence as yet on the effectiveness of this approach. 
•   Colombia passed the so-called Traffic Light Law in 1997 as a way to increase control over 
subnational debt by the central government; see Braun and Tommasi (2002). This law 
brought into effect a rating system for territorial governments based on the ratios of interest 
payments to operational savings and of debt to current revenues. Highly indebted local 
governments (red light) were prohibited from borrowing, and intermediate cases (yellow light) 
were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Finance. The law was initially not fully 
effective, as some local governments with a red light rating presented misleading financial 
information to banks and so obtained new financing. This has led supervisory authorities to 
rule that debt of any territory with a red rating must be fully provisioned, increasing the cost 
of such loans for banks. The ruling was strengthened in 2000 with the Sub-national Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. 
•  In  2000,  Mexico established a rule linking banks’ capital risk weighting of loans to state 
governments to the international rating of the governments. The pricing of bank loans thus 
became a function of the underlying risk of the state government. 
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 •  In  India, banks’ investment in state government securities issued outside the regular 
borrowing programme (which is approved by the National Planning Commission) attracts a 
risk weight of 20% for the purpose of provisioning. In case of default, such investments are 
to be treated as non-performing assets, and a 100% risk weight is to be attached with 
adequate provisioning. 
6.  Approaches to fiscal adjustment 
Most emerging economies recognise the need to reduce fiscal deficits, but as yet few have addressed 
the problem comprehensively. Most have engaged in piecemeal policymaking to mitigate the most 
pressing deficit and debt problems. A key issue that arises in this context is how the choice between 
expenditure reductions and tax increases affects the ability of central banks to maintain price stability. 
Similar issues arise in the timing and size of changes in government charges, prices charged by state-
owned enterprises, subsidies and pension contributions. 
Central banks generally have a strong preference for reducing the size of the fiscal deficit by cutting 
public spending. The bulk of budget expenditure in non-Asian emerging economies studied in this 
paper (up to 80% in central European countries) is mandated by legislation on social security, 
pensions and public administration, over which the fiscal and monetary authorities have little or no 
influence. Nonetheless, it is widely recognised that spending on pensions and social transfers should 
be limited and better targeted. Any cuts in these expenditures are bound to have a large impact on 
aggregate demand and, hence, inflation, facilitating the achievement of price stability. In theory, 
spending cuts can be strategically aimed at unpopular programmes or be spread across diverse 
constituencies to impose minimal hardship on voters. But in practice such cuts are difficult to 
implement. Social transfers are widely regarded as acquired rights. In Hong Kong, which does not 
have a history of the welfare state, immigration pressures have led to a large expansion in social 
spending in recent years. In central Europe, early retirement schemes have been a costly solution to 
structural unemployment resulting from the collapse of central planning and enterprise reforms. 
Against this background, one approach has been to introduce expenditure ceilings in budgets. 
However, such ceilings are rarely effective and inevitably lead to requests for their lifting and, 
subsequently, domestic demand pressures. In Hungary, for example, public sector wages increased at 
double digit rates in real terms in 2001 and 2002 after being more or less frozen in real terms for two 
years, thus complicating monetary policy in an environment of slowing growth. Another approach has 
been to aim the cuts at areas that may have sufficient, if not enthusiastic, support to make them 
feasible; see IMF (1996). Examples would be unemployment insurance payments, the defence 
budget, and government bureaucracies, or contracting with private companies for services previously 
performed by the government. But as the experience of industrial countries shows, implementing such 
programmes is by no means simple and may create problems - and additional expenditures - of their 
own. 
The second basic approach to fiscal adjustment - raising taxes and other government revenue - is 
generally less welcomed by central banks because of its direct impact on inflation. Usually it is argued 
that tax and regulated price increases have only temporary effects on inflation. Higher charges for 
public services and goods produced by state-owned enterprises also help reduce subsidies by 
improving cost recovery ratios, and are therefore regarded as essential for medium-term fiscal 
adjustment. But tax and regulated price increases that would be sufficient to cut the large fiscal deficits 
in many emerging economies are often politically unacceptable. Moreover, by raising input costs they 
may create strong disincentives for investment and the growth of private firms. Argentina’s ill fortune 
with tax increases during the 1999-2001 recession clearly illustrates this point. Moreover, in countries 
such as Brazil and Hungary there has been a series of large increases in public charges in the recent 
past due to the need for relative prices to “catch up” in an inflationary environment. An additional 
argument is that the tax burden is too narrowly based in many emerging economies, resulting in very 
high tax rates for a relatively small number of large taxpayers. From the tax efficiency perspective, 
such tax rates should rather decline over the medium term, with additional revenue being generated 
by broadening the tax bases and improving tax administration. 
In view of these difficulties, the authorities are often forced to resort to steady increases in tax rates 
and regulated prices, thereby producing sustained rather than one-off pressure on inflation. If there is 
good coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities, such increases need not affect the 
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 ability of central banks to maintain price stability. Many central banks have in practice managed to limit 
the effects of recent tax and regulated price increases on inflation. Nevertheless, experiences across 
countries vary. 
In India, Indonesia and the Philippines, administered price increases - in particular of petroleum 
products and electricity tariffs - have in the past often had a strong impact on the overall price level, 
given the weight of such items in price indices and their linkages to other sectors.
24 Tax increases may 
also have noticeable effects.
25 Most central banks in Asia are not consulted explicitly by their 
governments on the decisions to adjust taxes and regulated prices. However, in Korea, the Philippines 
and Singapore, there is frequent reporting to relevant ministries and the government of central banks’ 
assessments of the impact of such increases on the CPI. Such consultations help ensure that taxes 
and regulated prices are not increased by an overly large margin when they would have a significant 
impact on inflation.
26 Central banks in the region monitor actively a range of inflation measures, 
including measures of core inflation that exclude various one-off changes in taxes and prices. In the 
Philippines, the central bank uses headline inflation as its target rate, but the impact of administered 
price changes is considered part of its escape clauses. 
Central banks in Latin America have very limited influence on the timing and size of changes in taxes 
and regulated prices, which are usually decided by municipalities, public enterprises and regulatory 
agencies. In Brazil, the central bank nonetheless has a voice in the economic policy council, which 
oversees overall economic policy; see Minella et al (2002). Increases in regulated prices and taxes are 
not excluded from the targeted (ie headline) rate of inflation in Brazil and Peru; they are excluded for 
analytical purposes from measures of core inflation in Chile and Peru. 
In central and eastern Europe, regulated prices have been rising faster on average than prices of 
unregulated goods and services since the mid-1990s, thus affecting inflation relatively strongly. 
Indirect tax increases have on occasion also had a large inflationary impact: in 2002, the Hungarian 
finance ministry decided to postpone the increase in the tobacco tax - which would have sharply 
pushed up inflation - at the request of the central bank. In Poland, administered prices are changed at 
regular intervals, which lends some predictability to their impact on inflation. The Czech, Hungarian 
and Polish central banks include the impact of tax increases or regulated price changes in their 
targeted (ie headline) measures of inflation. However, they control for the impact of these increases in 
their analytical procedures. Monetary policy in these countries will continue to cope with increases in 
regulated prices, as adjustments in such prices are part of EU accession procedures. 
                                                       
24  For example, prices of petroleum products in India were raised three times between June and September 2002, with an 
estimated total impact on headline CPI of 0.8 percentage points. 
25  The goods and services tax in Singapore was raised from 3% to 4% in January 2003. It is estimated that this increase will 
lead to half a percentage point increase in CPI inflation in 2003 (inflation in 2002 was –0.4%). 
26  In many industrial countries (eg Canada, Switzerland), central banks do not react to the level effects of increases in taxes 
and regulated prices on the CPI, but lean against the second-round effects (eg those coming from wage increases) of such 
increases. 
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 Appendix 
The fiscal risk matrix 
Liabilities  Direct 
(obligation in any event) 
Contingent 




recognised by a 
law or contract 
•   Foreign and domestic 
sovereign borrowing (loans 
contracted and securities 
issued by central 
government) 
•  Budgetary  expenditures 
•  Budgetary  expenditures 
legally binding in the long 
term (civil servants' salaries 
and pensions) 
•   State guarantees for non-sovereign borrowing 
and obligations issued to subnational 
governments and public and private sector 
entities (development banks) 
•   Umbrella state guarantees for various types of 
loans (mortgage loans, student loans, agriculture 
loans, small business loans) 
•   Trade and exchange rate guarantees on private 
investments 
•   State guarantees on private investments 
•   State insurance schemes (deposit insurance, 
income from private pension funds, crop 
insurance, flood insurance, war-risk insurance) 
Implicit 
A moral obligation 
of government 
that reflects public 
and interest-group 
pressures 
•   Future public pensions (as 
opposed to government civil 
service pensions), if not 
required by law 
•   Social security schemes, if 
not required by law 
•   Future health care financing, 
if not required by law 
•   Future recurrent costs of 
public investments 
•   Defaults of subnational government or public or 
private entities on non-guaranteed debt and 
other obligations 
•   Cleanup of liabilities of entities being privatised 
•   Banking failure (support beyond state insurance) 
•   Failure of a non-guaranteed pension fund, 
employment fund, or social security fund 
(protection of small investors) 
•   Default of central bank on its obligations (foreign 
exchange contracts, currency defence, balance 
of payments stability) 
•   Bailouts following a reversal in private capital 
flows 
•   Environmental recovery, disaster relief, military 
financing 
Source: Polackova (1999). 
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